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THE COMPENSABILITY OF POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER UNDER OKLAHOMA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
Post-traumatic stress disorder is "the development of symptoms fol-
lowing a psychologically traumatic event not generally encountered in
human experience."' The workers' compensation laws of Oklahoma do
not specifically recognize or exclude post-traumatic stress disorder as a
compensable accidental injury. However, Oklahoma courts have de-
clined to accept an interpretation that would allow the definition of in-
jury to include mental injuries unaccompanied by physical injury. A
recent unpublished Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision, Fenwick v.
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,2 awarded compensation to a psychologist
who developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being held
hostage by an armed inmate in the prison where he worked. In a five-
four decision,3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals decision, adhering to the longstanding judicially imposed limitation
requiring an "accidental injury" under the workers' compensation act to
include a physical injury element. While the Oklahoma Court of Ap-
peals concluded that finding post-traumatic stress as an accidental injury
was not inconsistent with prior case law,4 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that absent a physical injury, a purely mental injury
such as post-traumatic stress is not compensable under the Act.' Post-
traumatic stress disorder resulting from a specific violent or dangerous
job-related event, without manifestation of physical injury, should be
considered a compensable accidental injury arising out of and in the
course of employment under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation
Act.
1. Smith, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Often Overlooked Element of Trauma, 20
TRIAL, Feb. 1984, at 92.
2. No. 69,691 (Okla. Ct. App. March 21, 1989), vacated, 792 P.2d 60 (Okla. 1990).
3. Fenwick v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 792 P.2d 60 (Okla. 1990).
4. Fenwick, No. 69,691, slip op. at 4. The petition for writ of certiorari by the defendants,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary and the State Insurance Fund, was granted on January 11, 1990. Or-
der, Fenwick (No. 69,691).
5. Fenwick, 792 P.2d at 63.
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II. BACKGROUND
To alleviate the harshness in requiring an employee to prove an em-
ployer's negligence before compensation may be granted for work-related
injuries, workers' compensation statutes were set up in the form of "no-
fault insurance programs" specifically designed to preempt tort law.6
However, despite this direct move away from tort law, courts often mis-
apply tort principles to workers' compensation claims.' One such exam-
ple is the erroneous application of the "physical impact" doctrine.8
Historically, courts justified denying compensation for purely mental in-
juries because of the fear of fraudulent claims.9 Later workers' compen-
sation courts attempted to authenticate the mental injury by requiring
some form of precipitating physical impact.10 Thus, in order to prevent
abuse, some workers' compensation courts erroneously cling to the phys-
ical impact doctrine because it requires the existence of an objective
physical impact to serve as a guarantee that the mental disorder is "real"
and that the employment genuinely caused it.11
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of tort law to the area of work-
ers' compensation, the fear of fraudulent claims can be alleviated by rec-
ognizing three facts.12 First, despite the subjective nature of mental
6. Hirsh & Monroe, Psychological Mental or Emotional Injury Induced by Trauma. Ex-
panding Employer Liability Under Workers' Compensation, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q., Winter 1984, at
265-66. Whereas in most states courts alone have the power to define policy limits in tort cases, they
are subject to legislative directive when dealing with workers' compensation claims. Joseph, The
Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a
Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REv. 263, 282 (1983).
7. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 266-67. Prosser noted that the majority of states have
repudiated the narrow "impact" requirement, holding as sufficient the requirement that the mental
suffering or injury be guaranteed by some form of physical injury or illness or some other objective
physical manifestation. However, there still exists confusion as to what these two factors include.
W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 54, at 362-64 (5th ed. 1984).
Oklahoma follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965), recognizing a cause of ac-
tion for the infliction of mental suffering. See, eg., Williams v. Lee Way Motors Freight, Inc., 688
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Okla. 1984). The court noted that this new tort did not retain "the fiction of
theoretical physical impact or injury in order to justify the award of damages for mental anguish."
Id.
8. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 267.
9. See generally Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Technological Disaster, 18
RUTGERS L.J. 623, 648 (1987). The physical impact doctrine was, in effect, used by courts as a
reliability test to reduce the possibility of false claims. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 268.
10. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 267.
11. Joseph, supra note 6, at 288. In discussing the policy rationale, Joseph noted that "[t]he
subjective dimension of mental disorders creates policy apprehensions that permeate judicial atti-
tudes toward mental injuries." Joseph, supra note 6, at 310. However, in tort law, with the recogni-
tion of a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress came the willingness to
recognize mental injuries absent visible physical injury. Note, supra note 9, at 650.
12. Note, supra note 9, at 648. Workers' compensation laws were specifically designed to elimi-
nate the burdens put on an employee in a tort action, namely, proving the employees negligence, as
[Vol. 25:815
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss4/6
POST- TRA UMA TIC STRESS DISORDER
injuries, they can, and often do, produce physical symptoms which are
"capable of medical proof."13 Second, current medical diagnostic tech-
niques enable identification of the nature and validity of mental injuries
in much the same manner as the assessment of broken bones. 4 Third, no
relationship truly exists between the requirement of a physical impact
and the genuineness of a mental injury. 5
Relating these observations to post-traumatic stress, their validity
becomes evident. While post-traumatic stress is commonly recognized as
a psychological disorder, it is often accompanied by physical symptoms
such as weight loss, vertigo, and muscle tremors. 6 Moreover, the diag-
nostic criteria developed by the American Psychiatric Association17
serve as a tool for objectively assessing the mental injury despite its sub-
jective nature. Finally, by its definition, post-traumatic stress is caused
by an extraordinary event outside normal human experience. 8 The
event need not be physical in nature. Thus, the misapplication of the
physical impact doctrine improperly restrains courts from determining
that purely mental injuries qualify as compensable work-related acci-
dents under workers' compensation statutes.19
Although difficult, it is not impossible to reduce mental injuries to
compensable terms in light of recent psychiatric advancements. 20 Ex-
perts have stated that as a result of these advancements, many mental
injuries "are as easy to diagnose today as a fractured bone.121 In re-
sponse to employers' attempts to use the physical impact doctrine as a
means of avoiding liability for mental injuries, modem courts note that
tort law has no application to workers' compensation law,22 as it was
purposely designed to avoid harsh results to those workers seeking com-
pensation for job-related injuries.23
well as overcoming a vast array of common law defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 267.
13. Note, supra note 9, at 648 (citing Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 VA.
L. REv. 193 (1944)).
14. Note, supra note 9, at 648. See also Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 268.
15. Note, supra note 9, at 649.
16. Note, supra note 9, at 633.
17. See infra note 29.
18. AMERicAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DisoRDERs 247 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
19. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 272.
20. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 268.
21. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 268.
22. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 273.
23. See, eg., Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The National Committee
on State workers' Compensation Laws identified five objectives of the workers' compensation sys-
tem: (1) sufficient medical care; (2) services for rehabilitation; (3) emphasis on safety; (4) prompt
1990]
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III. POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
A. Generally
Post-traumatic stress disorder is categorized as one type of trau-
matic neurosis.24 There are three general forms of traumatic neuroses
that may be manifested as post-traumatic stress disorder: survivor syn-
drome, war neurosis, and neuroses caused by industrial accidents.25 Sur-
vivor syndrome is an especially severe and prolonged form of neurosis
most commonly found in survivors of such life-threatening experiences
as concentration camps, the bombing of Hiroshima, or mass disasters.26
War neurosis is a heavily studied area with most of the research focusing
on Vietnam veterans.27 Although post-traumatic stress has been exten-
sively examined in these first two categories, it is within the context of
workplace traumas that workers' compensation courts have recently at-
tempted to define the parameters of this disorder.28
The American Psychiatric Association specifically recognizes post-
traumatic stress disorder as a distinct medical malady and sets forth
carefully defined diagnostic criteria in its Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R).29 These criteria facilitate
delivery of benefit payments; (5) effective delivery system for services. Comment, Workmen's Com-
pensation: Compensability of Psychological Disability Precipitated by Psychological Trauma, 1975
WASH. U.L.Q. 1128, 1129 n.6 (citing NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS, REPORT 35-39 (1972)).
24. Smith, supra note 1, at 94.
25. Smith, supra note 1, at 94.
26. Smith, supra note 1, at 94.
27. Smith, supra note 1, at 96.
28. Note, supra note 9, at 626.
29. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. The DSM-III-R is recognized as a
primary source for basic psychiatric diagnosis. Joseph, supra note 6, at 269 n.18. The DSM-III
diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder were best summarized by George Mendelson as
follows:
A. Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of distress
in almost everyone.
B. Reexperiencing of the trauma as evidenced by at least one of the following:
(1) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event;
(2) recurrent dreams of the event;
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were reoccurring, because of an
association with an environmental or ideational stimulus.
C. Numbing of responsiveness to, or reduced involvement with the external world, begin-
ning some time after the trauma, as shown by at least one of the following:
(1) markedly diminished interest in one or more significant activities;
(2) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;
(3) constricted affect.
D. At least two of the following symptoms that were not present before the trauma:
(1) hyperalertness or exaggerated startle response;
(2) sleep disturbance;
4
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communication between the lawyer and the psychiatrist.30 According to
the DSM-III-R, the essential feature of post-traumatic stress disorder is
the development of symptoms following a psychologically distressing
event not ordinarily encountered in human experience.31 Importantly,
the triggering event is always of such a nature so as to cause feelings of
distress in most anyone.32 Therefore, two factors are critical to the diag-
nosis of post-traumatic stress disorder: (1) a traumatic event generally
outside the scope of ordinary human experience, which, in turn, (2) trig-
gers a specific set of symptoms. 33
B. Progression of the Syndrome
The diagnostic criteria focus on the accident itself as the "primary
causal factor" of the mental disturbance.34 The most common triggering
events include imminent threats, either to one's own life or to the life of a
family member, or some horrifying sight such as the traumatic injury or
death of another person.35 However, what legally constitutes the "ex-
traordinary trauma" is subject to dispute.36 One commentator describes
the traumatic event as extraordinary "if it is sufficiently atypical to the
individual so as to overwhelm the psychic defense mechanisms which
assist one in everyday living."3, 7 Accordingly, "[t]he more senseless and
irrational the event, the more difficult it will be for the victim to regain
the psychic equilibrium," affecting the ability to cope with the trauma-
tizing experience.3 8 The "completely unexpected suddenness" of a trau-
matizing event occurring "in familiar and presumably safe
surroundings' 39 is characteristic of most workplace injuries.
(3) guilt about surviving when others have not, or about behavior required for survival;
(4) memory impairment or trouble concentrating;
(5) avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the traumatic event;
(6) intensification of symptoms by exposure to events that symbolize or resemble the
traumatic event.
Mendelson, The Concept of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
45, 46-47 (1987).
30. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 45.
31. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 46. See also DSM-III-R, supra note 29, at 247.
32. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 46.
33. Note, supra note 9, at 627-28.
34. Note, supra note 9, at 627. Though psychiatric predisposition also plays a role in the devel-
opment of post-traumatic stress disorder, it is a factor in measuring the intensity of the resulting
mental injury rather than in determining the cause. Note, supra note 9, at 637.
35. DSM-III-R, supra note 29, at 247-48.
36. Note, supra note 9, at 629.
37. Note, supra note 9, at 629.
38. Note, supra note 9, at 638.
39. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 51.
1990]
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In general, one commentator on the subject describes the "psycho-
dynamics of emotional trauma" as consisting of the traumatic event, the
traumatic process, and the traumatic state.4° The resultant traumatic
state is characterized by feelings of helplessness which may temporarily,
or with greater persistence, inhibit the ability to deal effectively with the
traumatic event.41 These feelings of helplessness are often intensified by
accompanying symptoms such as headaches, insomnia, hysteria, night-
mares, and personality changes.42 The most common symptom of post-
traumatic stress involves re-experiencing the traumatic event.43 A recent
study involving a veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress found that
as a result of re-experiencing the event, he became unable to function
effectively at work.' Exposure to any stimuli that resembles or symbol-
izes the traumatic event may cause an unnerving re-experience of the
incident.4" This classic symptom reinforces the disorder's detrimental ef-
fect on the worker's ability to continue working at the very place where
the accident occurred.46
C. Detection
The task of identifying legally compensable mental injuries in work-
ers' compensation claims is now facilitated by advances in medical sci-
ence and psychiatry.4 7 A recently published scale enables quantification
of the severity of post-traumatic stress disorder. The "Impact of Event
Scale" is a fifteen-question test designed to assess a victim's feelings of
intrusion and avoidance.48 In addition, another test, the Minnesota Mul-
tiphasic Personality Inventory, may detect false claims of the disorder.49
Present-day courts are therefore well equipped with specific diagnostic
criteria to adjudicate fairly claims for new types of mental disorders such
as post-traumatic stress.
40. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 51-52 (quoting L. RANGELL, The Metapsychology of Psychic
Trauma in PSYCHIC TRAUMA 5 (1967)).
41. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 52.
42. Smith, supra note 1, at 93 (citing Keiser, Traumatic Neurosis." A Common Problem Rela-
tively Untried in the Courts, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q., Sept. 1970, at 1).
43. Smith, supra note 1, at 96.
44. Smith, supra note 1, at 96.
45. DSM-I1I-R, supra note 29, at 248.
46. See Smith, supra note 1, at 92.
47. Note, supra note 9, at 648-49.
48. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 56-57.
49. Mendelson, supra note 29, at 57.
[Vol. 25:815
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D. Treatment
Although the mode of treatment must be determined on a case-by-
case basis,50 a variety of treatment forms are available. One proposed
treatment gaining wide acceptance is the cognitive-behavioral ap-
proach." Therapy focuses on confronting physiological effects, such as
physical reactions to cues associated with the trauma, and behavioral ef-
fects, such as avoidance of stimuli that resemble the traumatic event.5 2
Experts agree that three to five years of weekly counseling sessions may
be necessary to remedy the disorder, depending on individual circum-
stances. 53 Evidence suggests that symptoms may worsen if left un-
treated.54 Manifestation of physical symptoms may also accompany the
syndrome55 and remain until the patient undergoes psychiatric treatment
for the underlying mental injury of post-traumatic stress.56 In this way,
post-traumatic stress resembles depression.57
E. The Causation Issue
When the disorder is the result of a specific, work-related event, the
injured person's ability to earn a living may be impaired.5 8 However,
establishing a causal connection between the mental disorder and the
work-related event is difficult. A number of distinguishable factors such
as the worker's family or financial problems could arguably also trigger a
mental disablity. 59 However, the causal connection may be established
by showing that a specific event occurred at work immediately preceding
the manifestation of the mental harm.' As one commentator pointed
out, "[c]ourts have generally found the case for compensation stronger
50. Smith, supra note 1, at 96.
51. See C. SCRIGNAR, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND
LEGAL ISSUES 149 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Smith, supra note 1, at 96.
54. Note, supra note 9, at 636 (citing Leopold & Dillon, Psycho-Anatomy of a Disaster: A Long
Term Study of Post-Traumatic Neurosis in Survivors of a Marine Explosion, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 920-
21(1963)).
55. Lipton & Schaffer, Physical Symptoms Related to Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in
an Aging Population, 153 MIL. MED. 316, 316 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Id. Medical physicians are often consulted by depressed patients complaining of physical
symptoms that are in reality the result of the depression and thus merely require treatment for the
underlying depression. Post-traumatic stress disorder was found to be similar to depression in this
respect. Id.
58. Smith, supra note 1, at 93.
59. DeCarlo, Compensating 'Stress'in the '80s, 1985 INS. COUNS. J. 681, 683.
60. To an extent, courts can objectively measure mental stimuli when such conditions can be
traced to "temporally and spatially definite employment events." Joseph, supra note 6, at 291 n. 113.
1990]
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where the stress is sudden and unexpected, and more easily viewed as
analogous to the suddenness of a traumatic injury." 61 Because the defini-
tion of post-traumatic stress requires a "psychologically distressing event
that is outside the range of usual human experience,"62 the diagnosis of
the disorder itself assumes the existence of a specific traumatic event;
thus it logically follows that a causal connection exists between this event
and the injury.
Mental disabilities absent manifestation of physical injury may pres-
ent a greater problem than heart or hearing loss claims because the sub-
jective nature of psychiatry increases uncertainty.63 This contention
alone should not render mental injuries non-compensable. Rather, these
psychological claims should be internalized within the workers' compen-
sation system just as claims for mentally-induced heart attacks have
been." 4 Psychiatry has expanded its ability to diagnose many prevalent
forms of emotional and mental illness.6" With all the supporting medical
evidence, the issue has shifted from whether the mental injuries are
"bona fide" to whether the alleged difficulties encountered in establishing
a requisite standard of proof should bar compensation.66 As a check in
categorizing these injuries, a combination of expert testimony and use of
the diagnostic criteria enunciated in the DSM-III-R can serve as guide-
lines for establishing proof.67
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
Cases involving the mental aspect of job-related injuries can be di-
vided into three categories.68 Cases falling under the first category-
physical trauma causing mental injury-are universally held compensa-
ble.69 Likewise, the cases falling in the second category-mental stimu-
lus causing a physical injury-are also uniformly held compensable.70
The third category similarly involves a mental stimulus, but the result is
a mental injury rather than one that is physical.7 1 This category can be
61. DeCarlo, supra note 59, at 684.
62. DSM-III-R, supra note 29, at 247.
63. DeCarlo, supra note 59, at 686.
64. DeCarlo, supra note 59, at 686.
65. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 268.
66, Note, supra note 9, at 652.
67. Note, supra note 9, at 652.
68. 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.20 (1987).
69. Id. § 42.22(a).
70. Id. § 42.21(a).
71. Id. § 42.20.
[Vol. 25:815
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further subdivided into two areas: gradual stimulus causing mental in-
jury and sudden stimulus causing mental injury.72 Compensating work-
related injuries under the third category (hereinafter referred to as
"mental-mental" claims) has caused the most debate despite the fact that
it differs from the second category only in the type of resulting injury:
mental rather than physical.73
A. Jurisdictions Denying Compensation
Courts that refuse to award compensation in mental-mental claims
have done so for varying and often evasive reasons. The most common
rationales hold:
(1) that economic considerations prevent extending workers' com-
pensation statutes to encompass purely mental injuries;74
(2) that the issue is a question for the legislature rather than the
judiciary;75
(3) that the statutory definitions of "injury" or "accident" do not
encompass mental-mental claims;76
(4) that a sufficient causal connection between the purely mental
injury and the employment does not exist.7 7
These rationales represent an underlying policy concerning the eco-
nomic repercussions in compensating these claims,78 as well as the inher-
ent doubt that the mental injuries are real.
In the recent federal case of Gaston v. Flowers Transportation,79 the
72. Id. § 42.23(a), (b). For a comprehensive discussion concerning the compensability of grad-
ual stress claims, see Comment, The Logical Recognition of Gradual Stress Disability Under
Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Law, 23 TULSA L.J. 461 (1988).
73. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 68, at § 42.20.
74. See, ag., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 51, 55, 579 P.2d 555,
559 (1978) (Gordon, J., dissenting) (the workers' compensation system was not intended to be a
form of general health insurance).
75. See, eg., Lockwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 887, 312 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn.
1981); Nugent, When Employees Seek Workers' Compensation for Stress, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
239, 242-43 (1988). Some states, like Colorado, have legislatively addressed mental-mental claims.
That state's statute limits recovery to situations in which there is proof that the mental injury was
"proximately caused solely by hazards to which the worker would not have been equally exposed to
outside the employment." Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and
Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 900 (1987) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-
41.108(2.2) (1986)). See also infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 165-71.
77. See generally Annotation, Mental Disorders as Compensable Under Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts, 97 A.L.R.3d 161, 181-84 (1980) and cases cited therein.
78. Cook, supra note 75, at 898.
79. 866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989).
1990]
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Fifth Circuit rejected a claim seeking compensation for a purely emo-
tional injury under the Jones Act.80 In Gaston, the claimant and his half-
brother were working aboard a barge when it was suddenly struck by
another vessel, causing both men to fall to the deck. The claimant's half-
brother was thrust over the side of the barge and crushed to death despite
the claimant's efforts to pull him to safety. Thereafter, the claimant be-
gan suffering from what was later diagnosed as post-traumatic stress dis-
order resulting from viewing his half-brother's death."1 The Gaston
court looked to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell, 2 which stated that "the question
whether one can recover for emotional injury may not be susceptible to
an all-inclusive 'yes' or 'no' answer." 3 Rather, the Court indicated that
any pronouncement would have to be tailored to the specific facts.14
Even though the Court in Buell hinted that some emotional injuries may
be compensable, later circuit court decisions have refused to follow this
lead. 5
The denial of benefits in Gaston stemmed from the fact that the
claimant sought recovery for mental injuries sustained as a bystander
rather than as an active participant.8 6 The claimant's mental injuries re-
sulted from viewing the gruesome death of another. The claimant re-
ceived no relevant physical injury and the evidence revealed that he in no
way feared such a possibility. 87 The court refused to extend coverage to
bystanders, thereby precluding recovery for his mental injury.
The court in Gaston did not hold that an emotional injury caused by
actions directed specifically toward a claimant is non-compensable.88 In
referring to purely emotional injuries, the court narrowed the scope of
compensable injuries in this particular type of work, stating that it was
incongruous to permit compensation of seamen and railroaders for view-
ing gruesome events because their callings "involve braving certain
80. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) states that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer
personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law."
81. Gaston, 866 F.2d at 817.
82. 480 U.S. 557, 570 (1987). The court declined to address the issue of whether purely emo-
tional injuries were compensable under the FELA, and thus the Jones Act, due to a lack of a fully
developed record. Id. at 567.
83. Gaston, 866 F.2d at 818 (quoting Buell, 480 U.S. at 570).
84. Id. at 821.
85. A survey by the court of later circuit court decisions revealed that only one circuit-the
Ninth Circuit-acknowledged the compensability of a purely emotional claim. Id. at 818-19.
86. Id. at 819.
87. Id. at 820.
88. Id. at 821.
[Vol. 25:815
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hazards and are traditionally not well suited to the squeamish or faint-
hearted." 9 This case illustrates the reluctance to extend coverage to en-
compass purely mental injuries sustained on the job. It also can be
viewed as a harsh result because few people would argue that seeing a
fellow worker crushed to death would have no impact.
An illustration of leaving the issue for legislative determination is
found in Followill v. Emerson Electric Co.9° There, a maintenance man
who viewed a "grisly" scene of a fellow worker's head crushed in a die
cast press received no compensation for his resulting nervous disorder.91
The court refused to overrule the line of Kansas decisions which allow
recovery for mental injury only when they stem from an actual physical
injury, 92 notwithstanding that claimant's mental injury resulted from
one specific incident and was as disabling as any physical injury.93 In-
stead, the court stated that extension of the scope of compensable injuries
should be left to the legislature.94
B. Jurisdictions Granting Compensation
A significant number of cases in jurisdictions which grant benefits
for mental injuries involve workers that were exposed to one specific trig-
gering incident, in contrast to injuries resulting from a gradual build-up
of events. A sudden stimuli element allows courts to analogize the men-
tally traumatic event to a traditional physical injury.95
89. Id. at 820.
90. 234 Kan. 791, 674 P.2d 1050 (1984).
91. Id. at 791, 674 P.2d at 1050.
92. Id. at 796, 674 P.2d at 1053.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court held that the claimant's mental disorder did not qualify as a "personal in-
jury" as defined by the state's Workers' Compensation Act notwithstanding that the definition states
that a personal injury is a "lesion or change in the physical structure of the body," and further states
that it is not necessary that such a lesion or change "present external or visible signs of its existence."
Id. at 793, 674 P.2d at 1051 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508(e) (1974)). An argument can be
made that this definition includes mental injuries which ordinarily are not visible. However, the
"damage to the physical structure of the body" language poses problems for many courts attempting
to construe their Acts to include such injuries. See infra text accompanying notes 112-19 for courts
which have construed this language to include mental-mental claims despite no clearer legislative
directive requiring them to do so.
95. Cook, supra note 75, at 905.
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1. Early Recognition
One of the earliest cases recognizing the validity of allowing com-
pensation for a mental injury absent any physical manifestation was Bur-
lington Mills Corp. v. Hagood. 6 There, the claimant developed a mental
disability in the form of traumatic neurosis after being severely fright-
ened by a sudden electric flash caused by a short circuit in a nearby
wire.97 The Virginia court noted the importance of considering the "ner-
vous system and mental makeup and their intimate relation to [a per-
son's] vital forces."9 The court held that there was a sufficient causal
relationship between the electric flash and the claimant's resulting mental
injury to allow compensation.99 Moreover, the court, while acknowledg-
ing the common law physical impact rule in tort, concluded that this rule
has no application under the workers' compensation system, which was
designed to compensate for work-related injuries rather than to award
damages for a wrong done in tort.1" Finally, the court placed great
weight on the medical expert's determination that traumatic neurosis is
in fact an ailment recognized by the medical profession. 10 1 The case is
important both for its recognition that the physical impact doctrine has
no application in workers' compensation claims and that medical testi-
mony can confirm the validity of mental injuries resulting from work-
related emotional stimuli.
2. Scope of "Accidental Injury"
Two related problems encountered by workers' compensation courts
in claims for purely mental injuries include placing the mental injury
within the scope of the term "accidental injury" and finding a causal
relationship between the work-related event and the mental disability.
Statutes generally do not set out exactly what constitutes an accidental
injury, therefore interpretation has been left to the courts. 10 2
In Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 10 the New York high court
96. 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
97. Id. at 204, 13 S.E.2d at 292.




101. Id. at 211, 13 S.E.2d at 294.
102. See, eg., Comment, supra note 23, at 1133. See also text infra accompanying note 144.
103. 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975). New York's workers' compen-
sation statute is similar to that of Oklahoma in that it also defines the term "injury" as an "acciden-
tal injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Id. at 508, 330 N.E.2d at 605, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 640 (citing N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW §§ 2(7), 10 (Consol. 1965)); cf OKLA. STAT. tit.
[Vol. 25:815
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specifically addressed the question of whether a mental injury precipi-
tated by psychic trauma fell within the "accidental injury" requirement
of the workers' compensation statute. The claim involved a worker who
became severely depressed as a result of discovering her boss's body in
his office after he had killed himself."°  The court stressed that no reason
exists for denying recovery where both the cause and the effect are purely
mental. 105 Inasmuch as the court had previously recognized the com-
pensability of claims involving a psychic element either as the causal fac-
tor of a resulting injury or as the injury itself, it held that a psychological
injury caused by a psychic trauma was just as compensable as any physi-
cal injury under their Act. 106
3. Ridiculousness of the Physical/Mental Distinction
An Illinois case particularly noteworthy for repudiating a physical
element requirement and imposing a sudden stimuli requirement is Path-
finder Co. v. Industrial Commission.107 There, the claimant suffered se-
vere mental shock as a result of viewing a fellow employee's hand being
severed in a punch press. The court directly addressed whether an em-
ployee who suffered a severe, sudden emotional shock and resulting
mental disability "traceable to a definite time and place and to a readily
perceivable cause" could recover absent a showing of physical injury
under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.'0 8 The court con-
strued the term "accident" broadly to encompass anything that happens
unexpectedly and noted previous decisions finding that a "psychological
disability is not of itself noncompensable."' 9 Armed with this support,
the Pathfinder court determined that compensation should be awarded to
claimants for purely mental injuries caused by some form of sudden stim-
uli even when no physical trauma is sustained." 0 Citing a number of
cases granting recovery for psychological disabilities when the physical
85, § I 1 (Supp. 1988). Both New York and Oklahoma leave the task of defining "accidental injury"
to the courts. See Comment, supra note 23, at 1133.
104. Wolfe, 36 N.Y.2d at 507-08, 330 N.E.2d at 604, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
105. Id. at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
106. Id. See also Peters v. New York State Agric. & Indus. School, 64 A.D.2d 749, 406
N.Y.S.2d 638 (1978), where the sole supervisor present when a "riot" occurred among the students
at the school for delinquent boys was awarded compensation for distress and fear of bodily harm
even though no physical injury was sustained.
107. 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976).
108. Id. at 562, 343 N.E.2d at 916.
109. Id. at 563, 343 N.E.2d at 917.
110. Id. at 564, 343 N.E.2d at 917.
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injury was minor, the court stressed the ridiculousness of making a dis-
tinction between claimants with very minor physical injury and those
with no physical injury at all.'
In Bailey v. American General Insurance Co., 112 the Supreme Court
of Texas upheld compensation for a purely mental injury despite the lim-
ited language of the Texas workers' compensation statute defining "in-
jury" as "damage or harm to the physical structure of the body."" 3 The
claimant suffered from a disabling neurosis after viewing a fellow em-
ployee falling to his death from scaffolding where both were working. 114
After noting that the workers' compensation statute is to be construed
liberally, the court interpreted "physical structure of the body" to in-
clude the "entire body, not simply.., the skeletal structure or... the
circulatory system or . .. digestive system . . . [but the] complex of
perfectly integrated and interdependent bones, tissues and organs which
function together by means of electrical, chemical and mechanical
processes in a living, breathing, functioning individual.""'  All parties
agreed that the claimant had suffered greatly from the experience. More-
over, medical testimony established that the claimant's body no longer
functioned properly. 11 The court questioned whether it was possible to
hold that "as a matter of law, even though a 'physical structure' no
longer functions properly, it has suffered no 'harm'."'" 7 Answering in
the negative, the court interpreted the term "injury" to include the claim-
ant's disabling mental disorder which was quite real though lacking in
visible physical manifestation." 8 The court noted that rejection of this
"dichotomy between 'mind' and 'body' " was an established trend among
the various states."19
111. Id. The court best summarizes the issue:
[TMhere is little to support a rule that allows an award for a claimant ... who is suffering
from psychological disabilities caused by an often minor physical injury but denies an
award to a claimant with a similar psychological disability brought about ... by a sudden,
severe emotional shock and who fortuitously did not sustain any physical injury in his
accident.
Id.
112. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
113. Id. at 435, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
114. Id. at 432, 279 S.W.2d at 316.
115. Id. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Id. at 437, 279 $.W.2d at 319.
119. Id. at 438, 279 $.W.2d at 319.
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4. Putting the Issue to Rest
A recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, Sparks v. Tulane Medical
Center Hospital and Clinic,12 0 put the issue to rest in finding a mental
injury compensable when induced by a "significant employment inci-
dent" without an accompanying physical trauma.121 The claimant, who
worked as an "exchange card supervisor" stocking the medical supply
rooms at a hospital, observed various incidents of theft, vandalism, and
drug use in her work area. She reported her findings to her supervisor in
an effort to stop these practices, and personally warned some of the em-
ployees. The claimant was thereafter subjected to repeated instances of
harassment from co-employees. On one day in particular, the claimant
returned to work after the weekend to discover that the supply room had
not been stocked by the weekend employees. After reporting this inci-
dent to her supervisor, the claimant learned that this group of co-em-
ployees had threatened her personal safety.' The claimant became so
upset and frightened that she left work and was unable to return." 3 The
employer argued that (1) she did not prove that her mental injury re-
sulted from an "accident" as required by Louisiana's Workers' Compen-
sation Act, and (2) because no physical trauma accompanied the alleged
mental injury, she did not suffer a compensable injury involving "vio-
lence to the physical structure of the body."' 24
The court first interpreted an accidental "event" as requiring either
"an unexpected and sudden or violent occurrence which causes injury, or
... an unexpected change in the employee's physical condition which
renders him incapable of working" and is, at least in part, caused by the
employment.125 While noting that the definition of "injury" does not
draw a distinction between mental and physical injuries, the court ac-
knowledged that previous Louisiana decisions have often drawn such a
distinction. 2 In discussing various states' recognition of both "physi-
cal-mental" and "mental-physical" categories, the court reasoned that no
justification exists for allowing compensation for injuries arising from
slight physical exertion while denying compensation for those same inju-
ries if brought on by mental exertion.' 27 Under this line of reasoning, a
120. 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989).
121. Id. at 139-40.
122. Id. at 140-41.
123. Id. at 141.
124. Id. at 142 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021(1), (7) (West Supp. 1989)).
125. Id. at 143 (emphasis original) (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 143-44.
127. Id. at 144.
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stroke resulting from a heated argument with a supervisor would be just
as compensable as one brought on by lifting heavy objects in the course
of employment. 128
The Sparks court noted that the decisions denying compensation did
so on the ground that some form of physical trauma was needed to sat-
isfy the statutory "injury" requirement.1 29 In contrast, those courts
granting compensation found that a serious mental disability that pre-
vents the employee from working is a sufficient "injury" under the stat-
ute.130 The court stated that "'[w]e cannot ignore the scientific fact that
mental disorders constitute an injury to the physical capabilities of a
worker.' "131
Resolution of the dispute required interpretation of the phrase "in-
jury by violence to the physical structure of the body."13 2 "Violence"
had been previously interpreted to mean damage or harm, not necessarily
a "blow or visible application of force;"' 133 violence need not be the cause
of the injury, but rather is the injury. Further, the term "physical struc-
ture of the body" was deemed to include the body as a whole, not simply
the skeletal structure, organs, and tissue.' 34
Thus, the claimant's mental injury was compensable with one quali-
fication-proof that the injury resulted from a sudden or violent unex-
pected employment-related event which satisfied the statutory "accident"
requirement. 135 Ironically, the court affirmed the plaintiff's award
notwithstanding that the worker had presented evidence of a series of
incidents of harassment. 36 While the general hostile atmosphere left the
worker "helpless and afraid," the specific threats communicated on one
specific day constituted the sudden event triggering the disability that
curtailed her work performance.' 37
128. Id.
129. Id. The category of "mental-mental" had been the subject of disagreement among the vari-
ous appellate courts in Louisiana. The factual situation in Sparks afforded the Louisiana Supreme
Court an opportunity to settle the issue.
130. Id. at 144-45.
131. Id. at 145 (quoting Jones v. City of New Orleans, 514 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987),
writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (La. 1987)).
132. Id. at 145.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 145-46 (quoting Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 436, 279 S.W.2d
315, 318 (1955)).
135. Id. at 147.
136. Id. at 148.
137. Id. at 149.
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5. Mental Injury as an Occupational Disease
While a number of courts allowing compensation still impose some
form of sudden stimulus requirment, a few courts have gone considerably
further, classifying a mental injury induced by emotional stimuli as an
occupational disease.13 In City of Aurora v. Industrial Commission,139
the court classified post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from stressful
conditions of employment as an occupational disease rather than an acci-
dental injury.1 Occupational disease under the Colorado Act must re-
sult directly from employment or working conditions, follow as a natural
result of employment, and be traceable causally to the work rather than
from some hazard outside employment. 141 Without much discussion, the
court held that compensation could be awarded for post-traumatic stress
disorder as an occupational disease caused by "the unique psychological
stresses of undercover narcotics work."1 42
V. COMPENSABILITY IN OKLAHOMA
A. The Workers' Compensation Statute
Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act allows compensation for
an "accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment." 43 In addition, because of the remedial nature of the Act, the
term "accidental injury" has been accorded a "broad and liberal" inter-
pretation and has been defined as "an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening through human agency, an event which,
under the circumstances, is unusual and not expected to the person to
138. See, eg., 1B A. LARSON, supra note 68, at § 42.23(f).
139. 710 P.2d 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
140. Id. at 1123.
141. Id. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108(3) (Supp. 1984).
142. Aurora, 710 P.2d at 1124.
143. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (Supp. 1988) states in part:
Every employer subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall pay...
compensation... for the disability or death of his employee resulting from an accidental
personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment, without regard to fault as a cause of such injury....
Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(7) (Supp. 1988) defines "injury or per-
sonal injury" as:
only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or
infection as may naturally result therefrom... [p]rovided, only injuries having as their
source a risk not purely personal but one that is reasonably connected with the conditions
of employment shall be deemed to arise out of the employment.
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whom it happens."" Moreover, Oklahoma courts deleted the require-
ment of a slip, fall, or impact for an injury to be compensable. 145
Interpreting the term "accidental injury" remains problematic for
the courts when addressing purely psychological injuries notwithstand-
ing broad construction. Despite the fact that the statutory definition of
accidental injury does not draw a distinction between mental and physi-
cal injuries, 14 1 Oklahoma courts continue to require some objective phys-
ical manifestation of injury before permitting compensation. 47
B. Evolution in Oklahoma
Oklahoma courts have permitted compensation when a mental ele-
ment is either the causal factor of a resulting injury or is the injury itself.
To date, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has declined to accept the major-
ity position among states which supports compensating mental injuries
caused by mental stimuli.
1. Mental Injuries Caused by Physical Stimuli
Oklahoma first recognized a mental injury as compensable in Rialto
Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Industrial Commission148 The court consid-
ered whether a machinist may be compensated for the mental disabil-
ity-a nervous breakdown-sustained following his work-related back
injury.149 The court held in the affirmative, relying on a "long line of
English decisions" granting compensation for such injuries under Eng-
land's Workmen's Compensation Act.1 50 The recognition in Rialto of
144. Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 192 Okla. 322, 323, 135 P.2d 960, 961 (1943)
(emphasis added). The court explained that the term "injury" expresses the "thing or event" that
causes harm to the person, while" 'accidental' qualifies and describes" the injury as something unex-
pected. Id. at 323-24, 135 P.2d at 962.
145. See Nelson v. City of Oklahoma City, 573 P.2d 696, 698 (Okla. 1977) and cases cited
therein; see also Wilson Foods Corp. v. Porter, 612 P.2d 261, 264 (Okla. 1980).
146. See text of statute, supra note 143.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 148-72. Only a small group of states persist in denying
compensation for mental-mental claims: Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, and
Oklahoma. lB A. LARsoN, supra note 68, at § 42.25(d) n.10.
148. 112 Okla. 101, 240 P. 96 (1925). With this case, Oklahoma was noted as among the first
states to allow recovery for a niental disability resulting from a physical injury. Cook, supra note 75,
at 896.
149. Rialto, 112 Okla. at 103, 240 P. at 98.
150. Id. See also Wade Lahar Constr. Co. v. Howell, 376 P.2d 221 (Okla. 1962), where follow-
ing a head injury, a claimant developed a post-traumatic neurosis. After the claimant was awarded
compensation for the head injury, he sought an additional award for his resulting neurosis.
Although the mental disability manifested itself gradually after the initial head trauma, the court
allowed additional compensation because it related back to the original physical injury. The court
stated that "[d]isability from a psychiatric condition produced by an accidental injury is compensa-
ble in the same manner as any other impairment of the body." Id. at 224 (citing Rialto, 112 Okla.
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the compensability of a specific mental injury produced by a physical
injury set the predicate for awards in the cases that followed.
However, in Keeling v. State Industrial Court, I51 the court refused to
extend the rule established in Rialto even slightly when it denied com-
pensation to a seamstress who had a nervous breakdown allegedly due to
the strained seating position she assumed at work. While the court ac-
knowledged that some mental injuries are compensable-those that are
"the natural consequence of an accident which is compensable under the
Workmen's Compensation Act"-it found that the seamstress's claim
did not result from an "accidental personal injury." 152 The court empha-
sized the distinction between a physical injury caused by poor posture
and a disease caused by poor posture, the latter not compensable because
of the lack of a direct causal connection between the exertion of the em-
ployment and the injury. 53 The court held that a "disease of the mind
or body which arises in the course of employment, with nothing more, is
not within the act." '54 The court further explained that the disease had
to be directly traceable to a personal injury "peculiar to employment." '
Thus, in Keeling, the court denied compensation, not because it held all
mental injuries to be non-compensable, but rather because this particular
mental injury could not be traced to the employment.
2. Mental Stimuli Producing Physical Injury
Oklahoma courts also compensate in factual situations where
mental stimuli cause a physical injury, for example, heart attacks stimu-
lated by emotional factors. One such case is Bill Gover Ford Co. v.
Roniger,5 6 where the claimant suffered a heart attack-as a result of a
stressful increase in her duties as a clerical worker. The court noted that
the heart attack need not be precipitated by one strain but rather can be
the result of an accumulation of strains, and awarded compensation.15 7
101, 240 P. 96). The court reasoned that because the claimant's changed condition was attributable
to a prior compensable injury, additional compensation could be granted despite the non-physical
nature of the condition. Id. See also L.E. Jones Drilling Co. v. Harris, 403 P.2d 497 (Okla. 1965).
151. 389 P.2d 487 (Okla. 1964).
152. Id. at 490.
153. Id. at 491.
154. Id. (quoting Shoren v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 319, 140 A.2d 768 (1958)).
155. Id.
156. 426 P.2d 701 (Okla. 1967).
157. Id. at 703. Compare Liebmann Arctic Ice Co. v. Henderson, 486 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1971).
There, the claimant suffered a stroke after becoming angry over an incident at work. In denying
compensation, the court reasoned that claimant's stroke did not "arise out of employment" as a
"risk reasonably incident" thereto as required by the Act, but rather was the result of his own inabil-
ity to control his temper. Id. at 741-42.
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The case of Oklahoma City v. Schoonover'5 8 marked the commence-
ment of awarding benefits for a condition developing gradually over a
period of two years, in contrast to the previous limitation on "accidental
injury," which required the injury to be traceable to a definite and spe-
cific event. There, a claimant-police officer died following surgery for
treatment of a pre-existing ulcer aggravated by constant emotional ten-
sions at work. Inasmuch as his death resulted from the surgery alone, in
order to bring the claim within the realm of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, the ulcer itself had to qualify as an "accidental injury" under
the Act or no recovery could be allowed." 9 To establish an "accidental
injury," two requirements must be satisfied: The injury must be the "re-
sult of a risk reasonably incident to the employment," and there must be
a causal connection between the work performed and the injury sus-
tained. 11 The court found that the medical evidence suggesting that ten-
sion and stress from his job had caused the progressive worsening of his
condition, coupled with the eventual necessity for surgery, satisfied these
two requirements. 161
The court in Schoonover distinguished this situation from those
cases involving aggravation of a condition due to "worry" over the possi-
ble inability to work, finding "worry" not to be a risk reasonably incident
to employment.1 62 The court found that the aggravation of the police
officer's ulcer was not created by worry, but rather from the tense and
stressful nature of the claimant's employment.16 It is important to note
that the condition of the worker's ulcer developed over a period of time,
and that his condition developed as a result of mental rather than physi-
cal stimuli. 164
3. Mental Injuries Caused by Non-Physical Stimuli
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma was presented with its first oppor-
tunity to decide whether a mental injury absent physical injury should be
compensated in Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores.16 5 The claimant devel-
oped a nervous condition after employment had been terminated because
of his failure to pass a routine polygraph test. The court was concerned
158. 535 P.2d 688 (Okla. 1975).
159. Id. at 689.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 692.
162. Id. at 691.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 689-90.
165. 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976).
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that no physical injury precipitated the mental injury and emphasized
the fact that the nervous condition arose only after employment was ter-
minated.166 Although acknowledging that decisions from other jurisdic-
tions allowed compensation for mental injuries absent physical trauma,
the court declined to follow them in this case.16 7 The nervous condition
arose after employment was terminated, and therefore was not an acci-
dental injury arising in the course of employment as required by the
Act. 68 The court did not hold that mental injuries were never
compensable.
In Daugherty v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,169 the claimant con-
tended that severe emotional injury resulted from critical comments con-
cerning her work performance and from her supervisor's request for her
resignation. 170 The court, citing both Keeling and Vernon, denied com-
pensation, stating that a mental injury "with nothing more" is not en-
compassed by the Act. 171
The common elements arising throughout these denials of compen-
sation for mental injuries caused by mental stimuli are a lack of a causal
connection between the injury and the employment and problems in de-
fining the scope of "accidental injury." This unwillingness to extend the
notion of "accidental injury" to encompass injuries which are not accom-
panied by something that can be termed "physical" has heretofore been
the pattern in these cases despite the abundance of authority explaining
the fallacy of any distinction between "what is physical" and "what is
mental." 172 However, no court has specifically denied benefits merely
because the injury was solely psychological in nature. Perhaps the issue
166. Id. at 1300-01.
167. Id. at 1301.
168. Id. at 1302.
169. 558 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1976).
170. Id. at 394.
171. Id. at 395.
172. Larson, in discussing those jurisdictions which currently refuse to draw a distinction be-
tween physical and mental causation, states:
The net result is that, if other jurisdictions would follow this lead, the categories into which
this article divides the cases could and should be reduced by combining "mental stimulus
causing physical injury," and "mental stimulus causing nervous injury," since there is no
really valid distinction between physical and "nervous" injury. Certainly modem medical
opinion would support this view and insist that it is no longer realistic to draw a line
between what is "nervous" and what is "physical." It is an old story in the history of law
to observe legal theory constantly adapting itself to accommodate new advances and
knowledge in medical theory. Perhaps in earlier years, when much less was known about
mental and nervous injuries and their relation to "physical" symptoms and behavior, there
was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for ruling out recoveries based on
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has not been directly addressed because no compelling factual situation
has yet been presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UPDATING OKLAHOMA LAW
A. The Fenwick Case-A Missed Opportunity to Decide the Issue
The case of Fenwick v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary,173 presented
the Oklahoma Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide the com-
pensability of mental-mental claims. Fenwick, a counselor in an
Oklahoma prison, unsuspectingly walked into a hostage incident where
four women were being detained by a knife-wielding inmate. 174 The in-
mate took Fenwick hostage; after hours of negotiating, Fenwick con-
vinced the inmate to let the women go free. 175 Fenwick remained in
close confinement with the armed inmate before finally being freed.
Although the inmate threatened him, Fenwick suffered no immediate
physical harm.176
Fenwick developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of this
specific work-related incident. 177 The manifestation of this mental injury
resulted in severe depression and anxiety, and was accompanied by
symptoms physical in nature, including severe headaches, vertigo, and
numbness.' 78 The trial court found that Fenwick suffered no compensa-
ble job-related injury. 17 9 This decision was reversed and remanded by
the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. 180
The Court of Appeals stated that "accidental injury" under the
Workers' Compensation Act encompassed a "functional abnormality or
loss" and that post-traumatic stress disorder was "clearly a 'functional
abnormality or loss' that arose out of and in the course of [claimant's]
job-related hostage experience with an armed and dangerous inmate."''
Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1243, 1253
(1970).
173. No. 69,691 (Okla. Ct. App. March 21, 1989), vacated, 792 P.2d 60 (Okla. 1990).
174. Brief of Petitioner at 1, Fenwick (No. 69,691).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. However, as noted in the Brief of Petitioner, the fact that the mental injury resulted from a
threat rather than a tangible physical knife wound is not dispositive as there need not be an impact
or contact for an injury to be compensable. Id. at 9 (citing Nelson v. City of Oklahoma City, 573
P.2d 696, 698 (Okla. 1977)).
178. Id. at 4.
179. Fenwick, No. 69,691, slip op. at I (Okla. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1989), vacated, 792 P.2d 60
(Okla. 1990).
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id. at 3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(11) (Supp. 1988) adopts the AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSO-
CIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT (1984) [hereinafter
[Vol. 25:815
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All testifying medical experts agreed that the post-traumatic stress disor-
der resulted from the hostage incident and that the claimant needed con-
tinuing psychiatric treatment to remain functional.18 2 Moreover, the
majority noted that the State Insurance Fund paid for Fenwick's treat-
ment for approximately four years, but later denied that an accidental
job-related injury was sustained."8 3
A bare majority of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fenwick v.
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,"'4 denied compensation for mental injuries
in the absence of accompanying physical injury, judicially limiting the
language of the Act. A majority of five justices stated that the definition
of "accidental personal injury" provided in the Act is not comprehensive,
and that it has therefore been the court's responsibility to determine the
scope of its definition.18 5 The court denied compensation, concluding
that "[tlhis Court has consistently held that physical injury must be pres-
ent for a disability to be compensable."18 6 The court so held notwith-
standing that Fenwick has clearly distinguishable facts from prior case
law. All of the cases cited by the court in Fenwick involved claimants
who suffered from general mental stress caused by ordinary workplace
problems rather than specific mental disorders capable of diagnosis re-
sulting from unexpected and unusual work-related events 8 7 Thus, the
court declined to fully address the issue, instead leaving it to the legisla-
ture. The court did so despite the fact that interpretation of the term
"accidental personal injury" has been left to the courts.
Both dissents contended that if nothing in the Act disallows com-
pensability of purely mental injuries, neither should the court. Justice
GuIDEs], as exclusive guidelines for use in evaluating medical evidence to prove impairment.
GUIDES specifically addresses mental and behavioral disabilities and states that "it is important to
recognize that residual impairment from a mental disorder may be just as real and severe as impair-
ment resulting from a physical disorder or injury." GUIDES, supra at 219. Moreover, GUIDES de-
fines "impairment" as involving "any anatomical or functional abnormality." Id. at 215.
182. Fenwick, No. 69,691, slip op. at 2.
183. Id. at 2 n.1.
184. 792 P.2d 60 (Okla. 1990).
185. The court stated:
A definition of injury is provided in the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) itself. This
definition is more repetitive of the requirements set out under section 11 than it is defini-
tive. Since the definition in the Act is not comprehensive, it has been the duty of the courts
to further define "accidental personal injury."
Id. at 62.
186. Id.
187. Id. The cases cited by the court as support for its physical injury requirement were:
Haynes v. Pryor High School, 566 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1976); Daugherty v. ITT Continental Baking
Company, 558 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1976); Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976).
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Kauger pointed out that the statute on its face does not exclude psycho-
logical injury without accompanying physical trauma from coverage.1 88
Rather, she noted that exemption of mental injuries from workers' com-
pensation coverage has been engrafted by the court, and not enacted by
the legislature. She concluded that recovery should be allowed in Fen-
wick, but not in other cases until legislative guidance is provided.18 9
Likewise, Justice Opala pointed out that "there is no textually demon-
strable legislative intent to exclude from compensability those accidental
injuries that result in mental scarring alone."19 He noted that the judi-
cially created exemption has no place in the statutory workers' compen-
sation law and was no doubt erroneously derived from common law
principles of tort liability.1 91
Post-traumatic stress disorder arising from a sudden mental stimu-
lus causing some form of debilitating injury is specifically capable of di-
agnosis and alleviates the need for a physical injury requirement.1 92 The
Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Fenwick properly addressed the disorder
as a specific, medical malady arising from the "impact of being exposed
to the danger or violence of a particular event" as distinguished from a
disorder arising from general anxiety. 193
The supreme court dismissed this analysis, stating that it does not
matter whether a resulting disorder is traceable to a single event, but
rather the critical factor is the presence of physical injury. 94 While a
physical dimension requirement allows courts to justify more easily
grants of compensation,' 95 genuine work-related injuries occur that cause
only mental trauma. The loss of former well-being compels compensa-
tion. Clearly Fenwick's post-traumatic stress resulting from the trauma
of being held hostage was more than adequately authenticated at the trial
level. Further support of its authenticity was illustrated by the State In-
surance Fund's payments for Fenwick's counseling sessions.' 96 The
188. Id. at 66.
189. Id. at 76.
190. Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted).
191. Id. at 64.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
193. Fenwick, No. 69,691, slip op. at 3 (emphasis added).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
195. Joseph, supra note 6, at 289.
196. After four years of treatment, the State contended that Fenwick suffered no accidental in-
jury. Answer Brief of the Respondent at 6, Fenwick (No. 69,691). This is tantamount to contending
that when it is found that a worker will need physical therapy for an indeterminate time after several
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point is that showing some objective, physical trauma, however slight,
does not make the mental injury any more real. Conversely, the failure
to show physical trauma does not make a mental injury less debilitating.
B. Three Underlying Premises
Three concepts have been accepted by the majority of jurisdictions
in granting benefits to the worker who has sustained a genuine work-
induced mental injury. The first involves the humanitarian and remedial
purposes of workers' compensation statutes which require broad and lib-
eral interpretation, and resolution of doubts in favor of the injured claim-
ant.19 7 This interpretation allows the mentally-induced injury to fall
within statutory definitions of "accidental injury." '198
Second, advancements have been made in the medical field which
indicate that the distinction between what is "mental" and what is
"physical" in terms of compensable injury is now without justification. 199
Proof of mental disability can be established as readily as proof of physi-
cal disability,' ° and accepted medical checks can be utilized to ensure
that the claimant is not feigning an injury,20 1 whether the claim is for
hearing loss or for post-traumatic stress syndrome.
Finally, causation can be established when a sudden, dramatic event
is responsible for a claimant's mental injury." 2 The existence of a spe-
cific event removes the difficulty in linking the harm suffered by a worker
to the employment.20 3
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court chooses to accept these premises
then in certain compelling situations, such as those described in Fenwick,
a strict physical element would not be required in every mental injury
claim.
C. Proposition for an Acceptable Standard
As the majority of courts recognize, there are ways to avoid over-
burdening the workers' compensation system without eliminating from
197. Oklahoma adopts this view. See, e.g., Andrews Mining & Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 192
Okla. 322, 135 P.2d 960 (1943). See also IB A. LARSON, supra note 68, at §§ 42.00-.10.
198. See, eg., Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430,279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), and supra
notes 112-19.
199. Larson, supra note 172, at 1260.
200. See text accompanying note 12.
201. See text accompanying notes 47-49.
202. See text accompanying notes 58-67.
203. Hirsh & Monroe, supra note 6, at 278.
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coverage work-related mentaly-induced psychological injuries. Accord-
ingly, states have developed a variety of standards. 2°4 The most restric-
tive standard allowing recovery requires that the mental injury be
directly traceable to a definite, sudden event. 20 5 Thus, the sudden-stimu-
lus standard is a small step from the physical element requirement be-
cause, although not physical in dimension, there is still "something" to
point to as the cause of the mental injury-the sudden, traumatic
event. 20 6 Broader standards allow compensation for mental injuries re-
sulting from both sudden and gradual stimuli.20 7  However, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court need not extend the rule that far. To ensure
compensability of valid mental claims while maintaining those safeguards
necessary to make sure that causation and genuineness exist, the court
could adopt a sudden stimulus standard. This standard represents a mid-
dle ground in that it recognizes compensability of meritorious mental
claims, but avoids the difficulties inherent in relating gradually induced
mental injuries to employment. 20 8 Nothing in the caselaw or the Work-
ers' Compensation Act prevents Oklahoma from extending coverage to
encompass these mental-mental claims as thus restricted. States with
more restrictive definitions of accidental injury have interpreted this term
to include these claims.209 Moreover, Oklahoma courts already permit
recovery for injuries of a more protracted nature. 210  The restriction
204. Larson classifies mental injury cases into four categories:
Group One: mental stimulus producing mental injury is compensable even if gradual, and
even if the stress is not unusual by comparison with that of ordinary life or employment.
Group Two: "mental-mental" cases are compensable even if gradual, but only if the stress
is unusual.
Group Three: "mental-mental" cases are compensable, but only if the stimulus is sudden.
Group Four: "mental-mental" cases are never compensable, whether gradual or sudden;
there must be some physical component in the injury.
1B A. LARSON, supra note 68, at § 42.25(b). See also Cook, supra note 75, at 903.
205. Sersland, Mental Disability Caused by Mental Stress: Standards of Proof in Workers' Com.
pensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L. RaV. 751, 769 (1983-84).
206. As one commentator noted, "[t]he chances of approving unmeritorious claims is substan-
tially reduced by requiring the employee to point to a distinct event that caused the disability."
Nugent, supra note 75, at 245. Inasmuch as Oklahoma has already accepted the viewpoint that a
mental disability may constitute an accidental injury, the only remaining problem is in establishing
causation which can be accomplished by imposition of a sudden stimulus standard. Hirsh &
Monroe, supra note 6, at 278.
207. See supra note 204. Under Larson's classification, groups one and two are much broader
than the sudden stimulus standard. Variations of these two groups broadly extend coverage to grad-
ually induced mental injuries such as those caused by ordinary everyday stresses and strains on the
job. See also Cook, supra note 73, for an in-depth analysis of the various broad-based standards
applied by courts.
208. Nugent, supra note 75, at 245.
209. See text accompanying notes 112-37.
210. See discussion of Schoonover, text accompanying notes 158-64, where daily tension and
stress from the job was recognized as a valid precipitating factor.
26
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss4/6
POST- TRA UMA TIC STRESS DISORDER
enunciated in Keeling,2" ' that a mental injury with nothing more is not a
compensable injury within the Act, is not inconsistent with the view of
granting compensation for mental injuries induced by mental stimuli;
Fenwick demonstrated something more: a distinct, sudden traumatic
work-related event that caused the injury.212 By choosing to adopt a sud-
den stimulus standard, the court will not be opening the floodgates to an
endless barrage of litigation for purely mental claims, but rather will be
updating the law to compensate in the clear instance of a work-related
mental injury deserving benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The majority position supports compensating mental injuries caused
by sudden traumatic events on the job. Fenwick presented a compelling
fact situation, providing the Oklahoma Supreme Court with an opportu-
nity to bring the law up to date with medical science. By adopting a
sudden stimulus requirement the court could avoid the difficulties inher-
ent in deciding mental injury cases while enabling the clearly valid claims
to be compensated. The timely recognition of post-traumatic stress dis-
order as a compensable accidental injury would enable Oklahoma to join
the majority of jurisdictions presently acknowledging the validity of
mental injuries without a manifestation of physical injury in workers'
compensation claims. The legislature should resolve the controversy by
amending the statute defining injury to include mental injuries such as
post-traumatic stress disorder, or if it fails to so act, the supreme court
should reverse its stand and address the issue.
April Harlton
211. 389 P.2d 487 (Okla. 1964).
212. Brief of Petitioner at 9, Fenwick (No. 69,691).
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